One Door



To Opportunity



Ν

E

D

0



Author



Jessi Troyan is the Director of Policy & Research for the Cardinal Institute for West Virginia Policy and was raised in Pinch, WV. She graduated from West Virginia University in 2011 with a Bachelor's degree in economics and a minor in Spanish. She received both her Master's & PhD in economics from George Mason University.

In 2022, Jessi pitched a Cardinal Institute project in Atlas Network's Think Tank Shark Tank competition in New York City. She is a guest host of the Forgotten America podcast, and her writing can be found in the National Review and the Charleston Gazette-Mail.

JESSI TROYAN

Director of Policy and Research



One Door to Opportunity

How reimagining and reorganizing the administration of West Virginia's workforce and social services can put more Mountaineers on a pathway to prosperity



Introduction:

Imagine you're a recently laid-off worker. Stress is already high as you're concerned about how the bills are going to be paid, how you're going to put food on the table, and how quickly you can get back to a steady job and reliable earnings. As you start doing the math, you realize that despite your best efforts, you're going to need a hand from public assistance to get you through this phase. As you start down that path, you're confronted with a labyrinth of programs, offices, paperwork, and case workers you must navigate while juggling the rest of your situation.

The diagram below, from Louisiana, illustrates how onerous and convoluted it is for struggling individuals and families to pursue and receive public assistance. Similarly, the diagram illustrates the same characteristics for government agencies and employees to administer aid to those in need.






Figure 1: Louisiana Public Assistance Program Map



Consider a more personalized example. Here, an individual seeking out public assistance, let's call her Julia, would start at the bottom of the diagram in the long green box, "Families and Individuals Needing Assistance." Depending on the multitude of assistance needed, Julia might only need to go to one office, talk to one case worker, and get on one plan to get back on her feet.

Suppose she and her family were in dire straits. In that case, she might be looking at trips to six different offices, conversations with six different case workers, and six different sets of expectations as she tries to get her and her family back on steady ground. There is little guarantee that the departments, case workers, and expectations for Julia are coordinated. This leads to an inefficient use of everyone's time and efforts while piling more stress on Julia's life at a time when she's already near her breaking point.

West Virginians relying on public assistance programs to meet their material needs are already between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Amid a precarious economic position, individuals in these positions are practically working a second job to apply for assistance from the myriad agencies that administer the countless programs and comply with reporting to maintain assistance once they begin receiving it. Though the diagram is for Louisiana, the same labyrinth exists in West Virginia and nearly every other state.

While these programs all serve the same broad purpose - to help people who have fallen on hard times - they are rarely, if ever, co-located, co-administered, or coordinated amongst, resulting in confusion, delays, and stress from dealing with the fragmented system. Each piece of assistance is administered from a silo, requiring interaction with different agency employees or case workers who deal only with discrete needs and not the whole picture of the person seeking assistance. Food assistance comes from one place with one case worker, childcare somewhere else with another case worker, and medical coverage from yet another location and case worker. Each piece is helpful on its own, but the whole bundle of assistance is not tailored to the needs of the person walking through the door and is riddled with waste on both the seeker's side and the state's various departments and caseworkers.

Put differently, it's as though these agencies are tasked with building the parts of a car, but there's never any quality control implemented to ensure that once all the parts are collected, they'll fit together and build a functioning vehicle. There might be tires to fit on a massive truck, a subcompact car body, and doors that fit a crossover. Yes, all these things are helpful in and of themselves. But they are not greater than the sum of their parts.

Returning to our example with Julia, doesn't it seem like it would make more sense for her to have one place she needs to turn to? She already faces tight time and resource constraints when she needs to start making appointments with agencies and case workers to get the assistance she needs. What if, instead, Julia could come to any one of those agencies, talk to a singular caseworker, and get set on a pathway back to stability?

This better, more rational model exists in Utah. One where workforce and social services are integrated into a singular agency, the Department of Workforce Services (DWS). West Virginia can learn from the Beehive State's implementation of a unified assistance agency, import the best and most relevant features east, and iterate into the future as mountaineers figure out what works best from both the administrative and recipient perspectives.





Vital statistics:

	West Virginia	National Average	Best
Poverty Rate	16.7%	12.5%	7.2% New Hampshire
Median Household Income	\$55,498	\$77,719	\$108, 210 Washington, DC
SNAP Population Rate	18.2%	12.6%	4.6% Utah
Medicaid Population	34.6%	27.7% (median)	12.8% South Dakota
Labor Force Participation Rate	54.4%	62.4%	71.9% Washington, DC

Table 1: Landscape Analysis Statistics i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi

With poverty statistics among the highest in the nation, median household income among the lowest, abysmal labor force participation rates, and high rates of SNAP and Medicaid enrollment, West Virginia simply cannot afford to do what it has always done. Whether the discussion centers on providing material assistance, connecting individuals to job opportunities, or widespread policy ideas, the landscape of West Virginia demands bold and innovative thinking to address the challenges that both currently face and have long faced the state.

Programs:

SNAP:

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is a federally funded program run by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to help low-income individuals, families, seniors, and people with disabilities afford nutritious food. SNAP is federally funded, with states administering the program. Specifically in West Virginia, the WV Department of Human Services (DoHS) Bureau for Family Assistance manages SNAP locally, operating through county offices. Approved program participants receive a Mountain State electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card for use at grocery stores, convenience stores, wholesalers, and select farmers' markets.^{vii}



TANF:

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, known in West Virginia as WV WORKS, is a federally funded block grant program administered by the WV DoHS Bureau for Family Assistance aimed at supporting low-income families in their journey to self-sufficiency while ensuring child well-being. WV WORKS delivers monthly cash assistance to eligible families with children, pregnant women, or young heads of household. In addition to supporting low-income families, the program is designed to help those near poverty maintain self-sufficiency, prevent dependency, and promote strong family structures.

SNAP E&T:

SNAP Employment & Training is a voluntary program available to SNAP recipients ages 18 and over to help them acquire in-demand job skills, advance their educational status, and find better employment. The program is federally funded by the USDA and administered by the WV DoHS Bureau for Family Assistance in partnership with local organizations.^{viii}

WIC:

Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children is a federally funded nutrition assistance program administered by the USDA designed to support low-income households with pregnant or postpartum women, infants up to age 1, and children up to age 5. The program provides healthy foods, nutrition, and health education, breastfeeding support, and referrals to healthcare and social services. Like SNAP, benefits are delivered via an EBT card.

Medicaid:

In West Virginia, Medicaid is a joint federal-state health insurance program covering low-income individuals, including children, pregnant women, seniors, people with disabilities, and childless adults earning up to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) under the Affordable Care Act expansion – more commonly known as Medicaid Expansion. Locally, Medicaid is administered through the WV DoHS Bureau for Medical Services. The program operates through managed care plans to deliver health services.

CHIP:

West Virginia's Children's Health Insurance Program offers low-cost health coverage for uninsured children, up to age 19, for families with incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid but within CHIP limits.* The program operates under a state-federal partnership, leveraging federal funding while locally administering benefits.

Workforce West Virginia:

WorkForce West Virginia serves as the statewide one-stop agency for workforce solutions. The agency offers support for job seekers, unemployment insurance, employer support, labor market intelligence, and veteran services to provide solutions to workforce needs in the Mountain State. The agency is federally funded through the Department of Labor and operates under the West Virginia Department of Commerce.

WIOA:

The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act is a federal program that integrates employment, training, adult education, and youth services aimed at aligning workforce programs with employer needs. In West Virginia, this program is operated by Workforce West Virginia.



WV's Current System:

The resources an individual in West Virginia might need to access in times of economic insecurity are dispersed throughout different government departments and agencies. Broadly, social safety net programs are housed within the Department of Human Services. More specifically, the Bureau for Social Services within DoHS provides support to West Virginians through the administration of SNAP, TANF, WIC, and programs to enroll people in low-cost health coverage such as Medicaid, CHIP, and other qualified health plans.

Individuals seeking support for employment-related challenges turn to WorkForce West Virginia, housed under the Department of Commerce. Here, they can access job training, employment, rehabilitation, and adult education programs. Moreover, WorkForce West Virginia manages the state's unemployment compensation programs.

West Virginians facing issues that cause them to turn to one of these agencies for assistance likely require services from the other also. While there are collaborative efforts between WorkForce West Virginia and the Bureau for Social Services, there are limits to the formal integration and cohesive service delivery to constituents across agencies. These limits contribute to inefficiencies in service delivery, administrative costs, and diminished outcomes for all involved.

Vision for the new system, based on Utah's Department of Workforce Services:

Utah's Department of Workforce Services (DWS) is built around two simple, but powerful, ideas. First, people should not have to understand government bureaucracy to receive a hand up. Second, a belief that the best and most sustainable path to poverty alleviation is through work.

At its core, the brilliance of Utah's model is bringing everything under one roof. Here, job seekers, employers, and families have a streamlined, customer-focused experience that aligns employment, training, and support services cohesively and comprehensively. Instead of navigating a labyrinth and bouncing among agencies for job placement, public assistance, unemployment benefits, and more, the Beehive State offers integrated support through a single, integrated agency with an ethos emphasizing the role of social services as a complement to the primary purpose of providing services to reconnect people with work.

While the over-arching structure of Utah's One Door approach delivered through the unified Department of Workforce Services is simple on its face, three key structural and administrative elements facilitate its smooth operation.

First, rather than having Local Workforce Development Areas (LWDAs), Utah's workforce assistance system is organized under a single statewide authority in the DWS. This structure allows for a more cohesive mission and vision and simplified administration, while allowing for local input into operations. Other states that do not operate under a single statewide authority, such as West Virginia, have the federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) funds flowing directly to the LWDAs that operate regionally without the same level of statewide alignment and impose administrative reporting burdens at that same local level, and across multiple local levels.

Parallel to the statewide authority, Utah's DWS streamlines and consolidates program eligibility determination under a singular division. Rather than consulting multiple agencies to determine eligibility for various assistance programs, an applicant goes to one location where staff in the Eligibility Services division can quickly determine which programs an individual qualifies for – from food aid, cash assistance, health care, and others.

Most critically, Utah has an innovative financial management system that streamlines administrative burdens related to federal cost allocation regulations surrounding the provision of services and the integrated delivery model. This fiscal management is based on a random moment time sample (RMTS) methodology.



Typical cost allocation protocols involve employees completing daily time sheets estimating their time spent working with individuals with varying program eligibility. Instead, under the RTMS protocol, a random set of employees is electronically polled to determine the funding stream that best matches their reported activity. From this sampling data, monthly expenses and costs are appropriately tracked and reported per their federal reporting responsibilities.

Through agency integration, streamlining eligibility processes, and using statistical sampling methods to track time use, Utah has established itself as the gold standard for meeting the people who walk through the doors at DWS, where they are, and providing services to them as distinct individuals with distinct circumstances and aspirations.

Success in Utah:

The logic and rationality of Utah's One Door system may be enough to convince many that a different way of operating workforce and social services is necessary. For skeptics, empirical evidence supports the model as well.

Let us first consider enrollment rates for SNAP in the Beehive State. While federal policies have facilitated increased enrollment in the program, Utah's SNAP population did not simply grow at a slower rate than the rest of the nation; it decreased over 30 years from 1994 to 2024.

	1994	2024	% Change
All States Except Utah	10.6%	12.3%	16.6%
Utah	6.6%	4.8%	-26.4%

Table 2: NAP Rates as a Percentage of Population^{xi}

Further, let us consider the labor force participation rate (LFPR) in Utah. To be precise, recall that the LFPR is the percentage of the people aged 16 and older who are either working or actively seeking work.xii Amid a nationwide decline in LFPR, Utah experienced a relatively small decrease in labor force activity.

	1994	2024	% Change
All States Except Utah	68	63	-7.4%
Utah	73	69	-5.5%

Table 3: Labor Force Participation Ratesxiii

While both cases are compelling, they allow us to consider further how Utah was affected and recovered from the labor shocks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Thanks to the efficiencies of the integrated One Door model, Utahns were able to regain employment quickly, and the state's overall labor force and economy recovered quicker than the rest of the nation. Consider that by August 2020, Utah's unemployment rate was 4.9%, compared to 8.4% nationwide. By December 2020, the rate had fallen further to 3.6% in Utah compared to 6.7% nationwide. Nationally, unemployment didn't reach rates of 3.6% until March 2022.xiv



Examples in other states:

Although it may seem like there's a vast chasm to be navigated between where West Virginia's systems currently are and the vision exemplified by Utah's DWS, there are manageable steps to be taken and destiny to be controlled at the state level. We can look south to Louisiana to learn how to chart such a course.

To begin, the Legislative Auditor in Louisiana undertook a series of performance audits of social safety net and workforce services. The programs audited included TANF, SNAP, SNAP E&T, and WIOA.

Louisiana TANF Audit Findings:

This audit took place in 2021. Among its findings, the audit demonstrated that pure cash assistance accounts for only 8% of TANF funds in Louisiana, being outpaced even by administrative costs. Moreover, the audit found that the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which administers TANF, "does not collect sufficient outcome information to determine the overall effectiveness of the TANF-funded programs and initiatives." Likewise, the audit showed abysmal work participation rates among program participants, with only 3.5% of families receiving assistance taking advantage of work-related programming.^{xv}

Louisiana SNAP Audit Findings:

This audit report was released in 2023 and examined fiscal years 2018 through 2022. Findings from this audit revealed that the overwhelming majority of SNAP cases were closed for procedural reasons, rather than because recipients gained economic stability. Moreover, most of these closed cases reopened within 90 days after sorting out paperwork. Similarly, there was a sharp rise in errors within the program from just 4.4% in 2018 to 45% in 2020, meaning that a significant portion of the SNAP seeking population was either not receiving assistance they were eligible for or receiving assistance they weren't.^{xvi}

Louisiana SNAP E&T Audit Findings:

The audit for SNAP Employment and Training was released in 2023, covering 2018-2022, found mixed results. While the state saw increases in service providers and program expenditures, participation in SNAP E&T decreased 93% due to the program's switch from mandatory, where work-capable SNAP recipients had to participate, to voluntary, where it was optional. Likewise, the portion of participants who completed training programs decreased by nearly half. Moreover, the training did not necessarily lead to employment with sufficient wages to move people away from SNAP reliance and toward self-sufficiency.^{xvii}

Louisiana WIOA Audit Findings:

The report for the WIOA audit was released in 2023 and revealed significant gaps in the number of Louisianans eligible for workforce preparation services compared to the number receiving them. Even when participants did receive services, that often did not lead to a job related to the training received. Finally, audit findings illuminated that a majority of WIOA participants were exiting training to jobs with lower earnings than they received before receiving training and/or education, thereby undermining the goals of putting people on a pathway to self-sufficiency and away from reliance on safety net programs.xviii

Audit Conclusions:

Taken together, findings from these audits revealed common challenges that emphasized the need for innovative thinking around program implementation. Namely, programs were not meeting the stated goals of putting Louisianans on a pathway to self-sufficiency while relying on temporary assistance. Many social service programs were increasing the populations they served, while work-related programs were decreasing. Overall, recommendations from the Legislative Auditor included improved oversight, better data collection and measurement of outcomes, and increased attention to the thorough program participation of individuals seeking assistance.



Louisiana Task Force:

Based on those findings, in March 2024, newly elected Governor Jeff Landry authorized the Louisiana Workforce and Social Services Reform Task Force (LA WASS) to develop a plan to fundamentally reorganize how workforce and social service programs are administered in Louisiana toward a more effective and integrated manner. The Task Force approved the report containing recommendations for Governor Landry and the Louisiana Legislature on January 28, 2025. In short, the report recommended reorganization toward a model like Utah's operations.

Legislative Activity:

At the outset of Louisiana's 2025 Legislative Session, HB 624 was pre-filed by Representative Stephanie Berault. The purpose of the bill was to transfer particular family and support programs from the Department of Children and Family Services to the Louisiana Workforce Commission and rename the Louisiana Workforce Commission to Louisiana Works.xxii

From a political perspective, there was something for partisans of all stripes to support. For Democrats, the bill proposed to deliver services to Louisianans in need more quickly. For Republicans, the bill offered a more effective pathway out of dependence on social safety net programs through the self-sufficiency provided by stable work. For folks animated by government efficiency, the bill offered streamlining of workforce and social service administration, eliminating duplicative services.

As the bill moved through the legislative process, another 64 bipartisan cosponsors signed on to the bill from both the Louisiana House and Senate. In each chamber, the bill was passed unanimously; concurrence between the chambers was also unanimous. Ultimately, on June 12, 2025, lawmakers passed House Bill 624 and HB 617, and both bills were signed into law by Governor Landry on June 20 to create the new Louisiana Works department.xxii

Program Integration in Louisiana:

Presently, Louisiana is in the earliest stages of implementing HB 624. In October 2025, SNAP will move from the Department of Children and Family Services to the Department of Health. SNAP E&T will move to the new Louisiana Works agency. This initial shift enables a more comprehensive approach to providing both workforce and social safety net services. Two years from now, in October 2027, TANF will also move to Louisiana Works and will move the state even closer to the One Door vision.

Beyond simply reorganizing programs under new departments in a way that more holistically addresses the needs of program participants, Louisiana is integrating the technological side of these programs to streamline service delivery from the administrative end. Specifically, moving SNAP and disability determination to the Department of Health is a procedural improvement because Medicaid already shares technological similarities in its eligibility determinations. As TANF administration moves to Louisiana Works, the scope of federally funded social safety net programs will be integrated with workforce development programs.

Implications of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act:

On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed the latest congressional reconciliation package, known colloquially as the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB), into law. Among other provisions, the bill included reforms to the nation's two largest safety net programs, Medicaid and SNAP, prioritizing reconnecting recipients with work while protecting the programs' viability for the most vulnerable. These newly implemented work expectations follow the model of the 1996 Welfare Reform package that led to remarkable results in increasing the employment of never-married mothers and decreasing child poverty. While these measures are expected to promote positive outcomes for vulnerable populations, they will require more intensive resources from the states rather than the federal government to implement.



Medicaid Reforms:

The headline-grabbing change about Medicaid reform is that starting no later than 2027, OBBB imposes a work requirement for able-bodied adults in the Medicaid expansion population. This requirement applies to individuals between the ages of 19 and 65 who are not caretakers or parents of children younger than 15. Exclusions to the work requirement extend to the blind, individuals with physical or intellectual disabilities, pregnant mothers, veterans, those with substance abuse disorders and participating in a rehabilitation program, and the medically frail. This requirement can be met by 20 hours per week of traditional employment, work training program, education, or volunteering.

Beyond the work requirement for the Medicaid expansion population, the OBBB increases oversight to reduce waste and fraud, requires more frequent eligibility redeterminations for able-bodied adults to occur every six months, and imposes cost-sharing measures for certain populations of expansion adults.^{xxiii}

SNAP Reforms:

Like the Medicaid reforms, the OBBB requires work, training, education, or community engagement activities at a rate of 20 hours per week. These requirements apply to able-bodied adults without dependents aged 18-64, adults with dependents 14 and over, and removes the exemptions for veterans, homeless, and foster children who have aged out of the system. Additionally, the bill tightens up the circumstances under which waivers to these work expectations will be permitted.**xiv

Further, the OBBB imposes more skin in the game by states in the administration of these programs. Beginning in FY 2027, the state share of administrative costs for SNAP increases from 50% to 75%. Then, in FY 2028, the OBBB implements cost-sharing measures for states based upon their SNAP payment error rates (PER). These cost-sharing implications could be painful for the Mountain State. In FY24, West Virginia's SNAP error rate was 9.43%.*** Under the OBBB provisions, the state will be required to contribute 10% of the program cost if this PER is not remedied.

Payment Error Rate (PER)	Shared Benefit Cost
6% and < 8%	5%
8% and < 10%	10%
10%	15%

Table 4: SNAP Cost Sharing Rates

Ultimately, states are going to be held more accountable for the administration and the accuracy of the administration of two of the largest safety net programs and bear the costs thereof. Given the high participation rates of SNAP and Medicaid in West Virginia, these costs may be more acutely felt in the Mountain State.

The time is now to begin streamlining West Virginia's eligibility and administration processes for these safety net programs. There is enough runway to thoughtfully reconsider how these programs could and should operate and begin a more efficient implementation before the federal requirements go into effect. We can look towards what Louisiana has just accomplished this year and apply the best practices of their model to the circumstances in West Virginia.

Failure to act now will lead to heavier burdens on all taxpayers and will harm vulnerable West Virginians looking to these programs in their times of need.



WV's Prior Steps Toward One Door:

Groundwork for this sort of transformation has already been laid in the Mountain State. In 2021, Governor Jim Justice issued an executive order creating a Blue Ribbon Task Force focused on enhanced integration of training and certification programs offered by the West Virginia Community and Technical College system and WorkForce West Virginia to provide a pathway for better job opportunities for all West Virginians and better meet the needs of employers in a diversifying economy.**

Outcomes envisioned by this task force include a similar One Door/No Wrong Door approach where West Virginians can go to any of these service providers and receive comprehensive assistance. Another recommendation included data consolidation to understand better who is using what program(s) to drive better service provision and enhanced outcomes across the state. Likewise, task force members identified the need for cross-training of state employees involved with workforce programs to deliver stronger outcomes.xxvii

From the work of this Blue Ribbon Task Force, the West Virginia Legislature passed the West Virginia Workforce Resiliency Act (SB 582) in 2022 to bring many of these ideas to fruition. Among other provisions, this legislation created the West Virginia Workforce Resiliency Office and appointed the corresponding Workforce Resiliency Officer.

Responsibilities of the newly created Workforce Resiliency Officer include coordinating with and among various department secretaries and higher education officials to facilitate and unify efforts for workforce development, job training, and education of the West Virginia workforce. The Officer also assists with the development, implementation, and management of a common application for these workforce strengthening activities and related wraparound services. Further, the Officer is tasked with advising the Governor's office on the broader workforce development landscape and helping to develop policies, plans and procedures to ensure that stakeholders and programs are being properly utilized to advance workforce development and proposing opportunities for legislative changes to ensure that such previously mentioned objectives are being met.

Given these recent actions, there is a demonstrated appetite for the kind of integrated, comprehensive service delivery model that Utah's DWS epitomizes. In fact, one could argue that pursuing the integration of workforce and social services and following the model Utah provides is simply a continuation of the momentum already established in West Virginia.

Next Steps for West Virginia:

State Task Force:

A task force to develop a plan for the integration of safety net and workforce development programs can be established legislatively or through executive order. Regardless of the political origin, the task force should be comprised of individuals with the power to gather necessary details and information from agencies to construct the comprehensive plan to integrate programs into a single, streamlined department. At the beginning of the task force's work, there should be a deadline for reporting their findings to the Governor and legislature ahead of the next legislative session.

Program Integration:

Following the recommendations put forth by the task force, lawmakers can begin the process of moving similarly intended programs into a single department. From there, departments can streamline eligibility protocols behind the scenes and focus on delivering workforce and safety net services to the individuals coming through the door. From the user side, this integration leads to a holistic pathway toward gaining or regaining self-sufficiency. From the administrator's side, integration reduces waste, duplication, and costs.



Conclusion:

The social safety net in West Virginia and most other states has become a bureaucratic behemoth that has as much capacity to ensnare people as it does to put them on a pathway to self-sufficiency. Lack of communication and coordination among programs and caseworkers leads to frustrations for program participants and introduces friction as these individuals navigate the system. This mismatch of intentions and outcomes is a disservice to those relying on the assistance programs to overcome hardships. Previous research from the Cardinal Institute highlights these critiques and concerns from social safety net program participants.


However, this is not a hopeless situation. The example of a more cohesive and rationally integrated version of workforce and social safety net services exists in Utah for other states to aspire to. Short of that model, recent events in Louisiana demonstrate a pathway where states can act independently of the federal government to smooth these frictions and streamline the administration of assistance programs. West Virginia can learn from these experiences and import the practices that best fit the needs of our citizens.

Perhaps most importantly, there is a great appetite to implement these safety net reforms in West Virginia. Cardinal Institute polling from 2023 reveals that when presented with specific policy ideas to address dysfunction in the safety net, support is overwhelming.** Support was the highest for regular performance audits and implementation of a One Door policy.

Do you support or oppose this idea?

Some have suggested requiring the West Virginia Legislature to conduct a comprehensive review of all public assistance programs in the state every four years. The goal of this review would be to assess the efficacy, efficiency, and relevance of these programs and to make necessary changes based on the findings. Would you support or oppose this proposal?


To simplify and streamline the application process for various social assistance programs, Utah instituted a "One Door" policy, consolidating multiple social assistance programs into a single, user-friendly application process. A person looking for assistance is connected to a single point of contact, whose job is to help that person find the services and support they need to get back on their feet.



Similarly, when asked to rank the importance of prospective policy changes, the One Door policy enjoyed overwhelming support.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the implications for states in shouldering administrative costs and responsibility increase the urgency for West Virginia to act. Maintaining the status quo will lead to increased burdens for program staff and program participants. The current segmented administrative model isn't serving West Virginians well in the first place, and its effectiveness will deteriorate as more frequent eligibility determinations and work requirements are implemented. Now is the time to rethink how we help the most vulnerable among us in West Virginia.

From the following list of proposals to improve the state's public assistance programs, which are most important for the West Virginia legislature to address? (Select Your Top Three)



Building off the 2022 West Virginia Workforce Resiliency Act and the recent reforms passed by our friends in Louisiana, there is no reason for the Mountain State to shy away from thinking and acting boldly about how we can provide better material assistance, job training, and connections to our fellow Mountaineers who have fallen upon rocky times. We don't have to brave new frontiers; we can follow the paths established elsewhere. Our future demands that we do things differently.



- i. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/acsbr-022.pdf
- ii. https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.S1901?q=S1901&g=010XX00US\$0400000
- iii. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/food-stamp-benefits-by-state#:~:text=The%20states%20with%20the%20 highest%20SNAP%20participation,(16.2%)%20*%20Alabama%20(15.4%)%20*%20Massachusetts%20(15.2%)
- iv. https://www.medicaid.gov/state-overviews/scorecard/measure/Percentage-of-Population-Enrolled-in-Medicaid-or-CHIP?pillar=3&dataAvailabilities=%5B%221%22%5D&measure=EE.9&measureView=state&dataView=pointInTi-me&chart=map&timePeriods=%5B%222023%22%5D
- v. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/wb/data/widget
- vi. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?eid=784070&rid=446
- vii. https://bfa.wv.gov/bfa-programs/snap
- viii. https://bfa.wv.gov/bfa-programs/snap-employment-and-training
- ix. https://dhhr.wv.gov/WIC/Pages/What-is-WIC,-and-what-does-WIC-provide.aspx
- x. https://chip.wv.gov/Pages/default.aspx
- xi. https://allianceforopportunity.com/how-do-we-know-the-one-door-model-works/
- xii. https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/august/labor-force-participation-rate-explained
- xiii. https://allianceforopportunity.com/how-do-we-know-the-one-door-model-works/
- xiv. https://www.dailysignal.com/2024/02/11/this-bipartisan-measure-provides-opportunity-for-congress-to-expand-successful-one-door-policy-on-welfare-and-workforce/
- xv. https://app.lla.state.la.us/publicreports.nsf/0/8b3b8d2ff12760d1862587b30083045a/\$file/0002563ca.pdf?openelement&.7773098
- xvi. https://pelicanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Integration-of-Workforce-social-services-can-lift-Louisiana-people-from-povery.pdf
- xvii. https://app2.lla.state.la.us/publicreports.nsf/0/c9aec15d7db1095d862589880056af3a/\$file/00001159a. pdf?openelement&.7773098
- xviii. https://app2.lla.state.la.us/publicreports.nsf/0/870a5b65fc86aa6086258a280070b155/\$file/00002a4f. pdf?openelement&.7773098
- xix. https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/ExecutiveOrders/2024/JML-Executive-Order-44.pdf
- xx. https://pelicanpolicy.org/opportunity-policy/comprehensive-task-force-report-presents-opportunity-to-drive-one-door-to-self-sufficiency-initiative-forward/
- xxi. https://legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1404651
- xxii. https://legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?s=25RS&b=HB624&sbi=y
- xxiii. https://www.centerforpracticalfederalism.org/one-big-beautiful-bill-what-states-know?utm_source=SPN+Communications&utm_campaign=f0f8a9dbbf-7.9.25+Dispatch_spn&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b16198267a-f0f8a9dbbf-127769038&mc_cid=f0f8a9dbbf&mc_eid=edfb3e31c8#medicaid
- xxiv. https://allianceforopportunity.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/A4O-Policy-Brief-One-Big-Beautiful-Bill-Analysis-Web-Version-July-2025.pdf
- xxv. https://fns-prod.azureedge.us/sites/default/files/resource-files/snap-fy24QC-PER.pdf
- xxvi. https://wtov9.com/news/local/gov-justice-issues-order-creating-blue-ribbon-task-force
- xxvii. https://www.newsandsentinel.com/news/business/2021/07/west-virginia-task-force-holds-second-meeting-on-workforce-training-needs/#:~:text=The%20Blue%20Ribbon%20Task%20Force%20on%20Aligning,and%20Technical%20College%20 System%20and%20Workforce%20Development
- $xxviii. \ https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=SB582\%20SUB1\%20ENR.htm\&yr=2022\&sesstype=RS\&i=582M20SUB1\%20ENR.htm\&yr=2022\&sesstype=RS\&i=582M20SUB1\%20ENR.htm&yr=2022M20SUB1\%20ENR.htm&yr=2022M20SUB1\%20ENR.htm&yr=2022M20SUB1\%20ENR.htm&yr=2022M20SUB1\%20ENR.h$
- xxix. https://cardinalinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/Dignity_Project_Listening_Research_Report.pdf



